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Wednesday  
13 November 1985

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**LIBERIA:**

**Coup Attempt Apparently Fails**

*Information as of 0300 hours EST indicates forces loyal to Head of State Doe have regained control of Monrovia, while the whereabouts of rebels who attempted the coup on Monday remain unknown.*

Monrovia is calm and most gunfire has subsided as Doe's troops move to reoccupy the city with no apparent resistance from rebels led by former Commanding General Quiwonkpa.

Doe announced on local television last night that his forces had quashed the attempt and were searching for Quiwonkpa. Army Chief of Staff Dubar ordered the arrest this morning of all opposition party leaders for questioning.

Quiwonkpa's followers apparently controlled portions of Monrovia and his home county in north-central Liberia for a short time yesterday. Despite initial popular demonstrations in support of the takeover in Monrovia, backing for the coup apparently eroded among units of the 6,600-man military.

Meanwhile, the approximately 4,500 US citizens in Liberia are safe.

**Comment:** The rebels probably met resistance from loyal members of the 800-man Executive Mansion Guard, which is comprised predominantly of Doe's fellow Krahn tribesmen, and from the 1st Infantry Battalion which numbers about 390 men and was established by Doe to guard against coup attempts. Although the rebels remain unlocated, they may try to escape through neighboring Sierra Leone or Ivory Coast where the plot was probably hatched.

Quiwonkpa almost certainly hoped he could take advantage of opposition protests of alleged fraud in last month's presidential and legislative elections to rally support for his takeover. The attempt, however, will now provide the Head of State with the opportunity to firmly suppress further criticism of the elections and intimidate opposition leaders.

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~~Top Secret~~**Special Analysis****LEBANON-SYRIA: Peace Accord Stalled**

*The car bombing of a meeting of Lebanese Christian leaders yesterday is unlikely to affect the deadlock over the terms of a Syrian-brokered agreement that seeks to end the civil war and reorganize the Lebanese Government. Disputes have arisen over the conditions for a cease-fire, the distribution of political power, and personalities. Despite intense pressure from Damascus, numerous Lebanese leaders across the political spectrum continue to voice opposition to the draft agreement. Warring militias still dominate the situation on the ground, and national reconciliation remains a distant dream.*

the draft agreement calls for the eventual elimination of the system of government based on religious representation, a new parliament and constitution, national elections in 1988, and a full cease-fire under which all militias would surrender their weapons to the security forces of a Lebanese government. The draft also requires the return of Christian refugees to their villages in Druze and Muslim areas.

Numerous mainstream factional leaders oppose the plan. The Christian community is deeply divided over the accord, which many believe would give Muslims too much power and grant Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.

Christians will never accept "a single Syrian" soldier in East Beirut and will demand that the President continue to be a Maronite Christian.

Shia Amal chief Barri supports the plan, but other top Shia leaders condemn him for negotiating with the Christians.

Barri will be unable to enforce the agreement.

Sunni leaders oppose the draft agreement because Sunnis would lose important government positions, and many Druze reject the plan because they do not want Christians to return to villages in Druze areas. Druze leader Junblatt remains unwilling to deal directly with Christian militia leader Hubayqa, who is the primary Christian official participating in the negotiations.

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### **USSR: Supercomputer Disinformation**

Soviet media continue to claim that the USSR does not need Western supercomputers since it has its own high-performance computers. Supercomputers have numerous applications in nuclear weapons design, armor and antiarmor penetration mechanics, cryptology, weather forecasting, and the modeling of advanced aerodynamic vehicles. Within the past year, the US and Japan have worked together to develop safeguards for Western supercomputers in order to deny Soviet Bloc access to them. [REDACTED]

**Comment:** Soviet claims of domestic supercomputer capabilities are greatly exaggerated. The Soviets, however, still hope the claims will influence other countries to weaken or oppose the US and Japanese supercomputer safeguards programs. If the USSR gained access to the details of a Western supercomputer, it might save up to five years in developing its own design. The best Soviet high-performance computers are 30 to 60 times slower than US or Japanese supercomputers and lack good mass storage devices and systems software. The Soviet lag in supercomputer development is estimated to be 10 to 15 years. [REDACTED]

### **MOZAMBIQUE-USSR: Foreign Minister Visits Moscow**


A Mozambican delegation led by Foreign Minister Chissano met briefly with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow last week and held extended discussions with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and party International Department head Ponomarev. TASS described the meeting with Gorbachev as an "exchange of opinions" on bilateral and international issues and the talks with Shevardnadze and Ponomarev as "warm and friendly." According to TASS, the two sides expressed satisfaction over their bilateral relations and Mozambique indicated its support for Moscow's foreign policy. [REDACTED]

**Comment:** Following President Machel's recent visit to the US, the Mozambicans probably wanted to assure Moscow of their interest in continued close ties to the USSR. The talk with Gorbachev appears to have been little more than a get-acquainted session; the Soviet leader may have expressed Moscow's concern over the prospect of increased Western influence in Mozambique. No agreement on economic or military aid was announced, but the Mozambicans did endorse Soviet positions on South Africa and Namibia, probably as a low-cost demonstration of their interest in continued good relations. [REDACTED]

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**COLOMBIA:**

**Aftermath of M-19 Attack**

*The M-19's attack on the Palace of Justice last week and the general increase in guerrilla violence in recent months are intensifying the longstanding controversy over President Betancur's handling of the guerrilla problem and probably will weaken his popular standing.*

The government has ruled out further negotiations with the M-19 but is willing to meet with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and other groups interested in continuing the peace process.

Betancur's handling of the seizure of the Palace of Justice is receiving a mixed reaction. Many commentators have condemned the M-19 and express solid support for Betancur's actions. The country's 30,000 unionized court employees, however, have called an indefinite strike to protest the government's refusal to negotiate for the release of the hostages.

The attack was the culmination of the expanding insurgency the M-19 has conducted since June, when it abrogated the cease-fire accords. Betancur probably refused to negotiate because of concern that his past vacillation toward the guerrillas encouraged them to act and his fear that anything short of a full-scale retaliation would have worsened relations with the military, which feels that it is being blamed for the increasing violence. The affair, however, is giving the President's political opponents a new opportunity to attack his policies for peace within the country, which have been steadily losing popular support.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is likely to accept the government's offer to continue negotiations because it has invested too much in the elections next year to resume open warfare. At this stage, however, there probably are more guerrillas—of all factions—opposed to the truce than nominally supporting it.

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**Africa**

— Responsibility for hijacking of **Ugandan** airliner ferrying troops unknown . . . rebel spokesman denies involvement though plane landed in rebel-held territory . . . likely to complicate Nairobi peace talks, undercut government abilities to redeploy troops.

— Students rioted in **Congo** over weekend . . . protesting austerity measure. . . some casualties . . . situation now calm . . . President Sassou's stringent policies likely to cause increasing unrest.

**East Asia**

— **USSR, China** have begun new round of talks on consular affairs . . . reportedly did agree in June to simplify visa procedures, reopen consulate in Leningrad, Shanghai . . . current talks probably focusing on details for reopening consulates.

**South Asia**


— Prominent **Indian** journalist says Prime Minister Gandhi will offer **Pakistan** friendship treaty next month after President Zia ends martial law . . . neither has commented . . . may be discussed when two leaders meet in Oman Monday.

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~~Top Secret~~**Special Analysis****SAUDI ARABIA: Economic Decisions Ahead**

*Riyadh's resort to lower prices to increase its share of the oil market has pushed Saudi revenues to \$2.5 billion per month, more than doubling its returns of last summer. Even so, Saudi finances will continue to be strained. There are no signs of a significant upturn in oil demand before 1990, and, more immediately, discounting schemes are becoming the rule among OPEC members. Demand is likely to slacken seasonally in early 1986. The resulting competition among oil producers probably will put renewed downward pressure on prices. Saudi leaders do not appear to be preparing for the tough decisions they will have to make next year if oil prices drop precipitously.*

Riyadh realized last summer that it could no longer continue to defend world oil prices and still earn sufficient oil revenues. It decided to link the price of crude petroleum to the market price of refined products to regain a larger share of the market. Saudi leaders tried to portray their move as an effort on behalf of OPEC to regain market shares from non-OPEC producers. They continue to believe there is an important role for OPEC to play, even though its price-setting mechanism will have to be changed.

Saudi Arabia hopes its new policy will slow the reduction of its foreign assets, which had been declining at the rate of \$2 billion per month. Although the strategy has worked so far—production has increased from 2.3 million barrels per day to 4 million, while prices have dropped an average of only 5 percent—a decrease in oil demand early next year could bring a dramatic decline in oil prices.

If earnings fall sharply next year, Riyadh's choices will be limited. Rather than increase production over its OPEC quota, it would try to limit the effect of lower revenues on Saudi life. It would need to continue to draw down its liquid reserves, currently estimated at between \$70 billion and \$75 billion.

Riyadh would also be forced to undertake some combination of taxes and spending cuts, including trimming social welfare programs and the salaries of civil servants.

Despite its previous reluctance, Riyadh will probably begin to borrow on the international market if oil prices plummet.

banks are not particularly worried about the risk of medium-term loans to Saudi Arabia and would probably offer Riyadh favorable rates.

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**POLAND:**

**Personnel Changes**

*The sweeping personnel changes made over the last few days seem intended to create the impression of more vigorous leadership in key areas, especially the economy, and to increase First Secretary Jaruzelski's political control.* [redacted]

All five deputy premiers announced yesterday by Premier Zbigniew Messner have economic backgrounds. Messner also consolidated several economic ministries and reduced the number of cabinet posts from 30 to 26. Two of the officials with portfolios concerned with youth affairs were also replaced. Most of the 10 new ministers are political unknowns who have not held senior government positions.

[redacted]  
Party oversight of the economy was changed on Monday when Politburo member Barcikowski resigned his Central Committee Secretariat responsibilities in favor of a Politburo member with more economic experience. [redacted]

Only one military officer, a general in charge of the Ministry for Local Government, lost his job, while the general who heads the cabinet secretariat was given ministerial rank. [redacted]

Former Politburo member Stefan Olszowski's fall from power was finalized with his loss of the foreign affairs portfolio. Olszowski told Western diplomats in Warsaw late last week he would retain the position. His replacement, Candidate Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat member Marian Orzechowski, reportedly is a pro-Soviet hardliner but nonetheless has supported Jaruzelski.

[redacted]  
**Comment:** The removal of Olszowski, Jaruzelski's main Politburo competitor, is probably the opening move in Jaruzelski's efforts to gain greater control over the party before its congress convenes in the spring. The victory may have been tempered, however, by some hard infighting. Jaruzelski, to compensate for Olszowski, may have had to drop his rumored plans to elevate two of his military colleagues to full Politburo membership. [redacted]

Olszowski has returned from the political wilderness before, however, and could remain a locus of opposition to Jaruzelski even without a government or party post. [redacted]

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**BULGARIA-USSR: Speculation on Zhivkov's Removal**

***Speculation about a Soviet-sponsored ouster of 74-year-old party leader Todor Zhivkov—now in his 31st year in power—continues in Bulgarian political circles.***

several high-ranking Bulgarian Government officials have cited General Secretary Gorbachev's displeasure with Zhivkov's recent mismanagement of the Bulgarian economy as well as his bungling of Sofia's campaign to assimilate its ethnic Turks.

The officials speculate that the succession may be worked out during Zhivkov's visit to Moscow, said to be scheduled for January, and that he might step down as early as the Central Committee plenum likely to convene shortly before the party congress. First Deputy Premier and Politburo member Aleksandrov reportedly would be the front-runner to succeed Zhivkov, although Politburo member and party Secretary Doynov, who also holds a cabinet post, is a "remote possibility."

**Comment:** Succession rumors have grown in Sofia as Zhivkov's economic and political problems have increased since early this year. This is normal in Eastern Europe before a party congress, but the Soviet Ambassador gave some momentum to the rumors last summer when he publicly criticized Bulgaria's economic management efforts.

Aleksandrov, a fast-rising protege of Zhivkov, is believed to be held in favor by Moscow and is a close friend of the Soviet Ambassador. He has the reputation of being a good administrator and has strong Bulgarian party connections. Doynov, also a capable economic manager, reportedly would not have Zhivkov's full endorsement since he is said to have opposed Zhivkov on several issues this year. Premier Filipov and Politburo member Balev are other leading contenders to succeed Zhivkov.

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**In Brief**

**Middle East**

- Local press reports **Persian Gulf** states providing helicopter escorts for tankers entering Gulf . . . first attempt by Gulf Cooperation Council members to defend ships from Iranian seizures. [redacted]

- [redacted] **North Yemen** last month sent its first air defense personnel to **Iraq** for advanced training . . . North Yemeni infantry brigade already there. [redacted]

**Europe**

- Anti-NATO demonstrations in several **Spanish** cities Sunday involved about 100,000 participants . . . total less than some earlier protests . . . lower turnout likely to cheer Prime Minister Gonzalez. [redacted]

**Americas**

- **Nicaraguan** security detained journalist of independent *La Prensa*, searched his home last weekend, according to press . . . regime in past has charged reporters in similar cases with counterrevolutionary crimes. [redacted]

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
In addition to the nearly insurmountable political disagreements, the draft agreement ignores the military realities of Lebanon. Factional militias have staked out their claims to large areas of the country after years of battling each other and the Lebanese Army, and sporadic fighting remains a daily event. The militias are unlikely to surrender their weapons voluntarily; Damascus does not yet appear willing to send Syrian military forces to try to enforce a cease-fire. Although Syria is pressing its Lebanese allies to accept the plan, Vice President Khaddam admitted [redacted] that Damascus does not expect the outstanding issues to be resolved any time soon. [redacted]

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
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~~Top Secret~~**Special Analysis****SOUTH AFRICA:****Rightwing Prospects**

*The strong showing by rightwing parties in the five parliamentary byelections last month has raised the specter of a conservative white backlash in South Africa, but it probably does not reflect a rapid, nationwide shift to the right.*

Although the National Party won four of the five races, the total rightwing vote was three times higher than in the general election in 1981 in those districts. The National Party won 27,062 votes compared to the rightwing total of 22,547. The support for the Conservative Party, which split from the National Party in 1982 over the issue of racial reform, and the victory of the extreme rightwing Herstigte Nasionale Party in Sasolburg—the first since its split from the National Party in 1969—indicate that the parties on the right have replaced the liberal Progressive Federal Party as the government's principal adversary for white support.

The ruling National Party currently is not in danger of losing control of parliament. It holds 127 seats in a 178-member house, and general elections are not scheduled until 1989. If nationwide elections were held today, local observers suggest that the ruling party might lose no more than 33 seats to the rightwing parties.

The recent election results probably understate the fundamental strength of the National Party. Recent nationwide opinion polls indicate that most whites approve of limited racial reforms and over 70 percent still think President Botha is doing a good job. The limited scope of the byelections—three were held in conservative districts—favored the rightwing parties, but the well-oiled machinery of the National Party undoubtedly would overpower the smaller rightwing parties in a general election.

The Herstigte Nasionale Party's new confidence also may increase rightwing infighting. The two rightwing parties agreed not to oppose each other in four of the five races, including Sasolburg. The Herstigte Nasionale Party's victory, however, may make it less willing to stay out of elections to help the Conservative Party.

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**PERSIAN GULF:**

**New Mediation Effort**

***Gulf Cooperation Council states are apparently embarking on a new effort to mediate the Iran-Iraq war following their summit last week in Oman.*** [redacted]

A Saudi press commentary yesterday urged the Council to involve the USSR in any negotiations, and Omani Foreign Minister Alawi went to Iraq last weekend for consultations. He cautioned, however, that his mediation effort would be low key and that the Council probably would not make a major move before spring. [redacted]

The Council believes Iran will not consider negotiations before it mounts another offensive, probably in the spring. [redacted]

**Comment:** The Gulf states' increased interest in mediation probably was prompted by their concern that the conflict may spread because of Iraq's repeated attacks on Khark Island. The states hope that their efforts, at a minimum, will deflect any Iranian hostility against them. Future diplomatic probes of Tehran are likely. [redacted]

There is no indication so far of an official approach by a Council member to the Soviets, but such an initiative may be made if the situation deteriorates and the Gulf states judge that the US has little influence with either belligerent. The Soviets would welcome an approach as an opportunity to improve ties to the Gulf states. [redacted]

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**TURKEY: Military Concern About Islamic Activism**

[redacted] Turkish General Staff Chief Urug is upset over what he regards as Prime Minister Ozal's accommodation of traditional Islamic practices. Reports of a meeting of a small religious party at which the attendees were sexually segregated and in Islamic dress have heightened Urug's sensitivity on this issue. [redacted]  
[redacted]


**Comment:** Urug and other senior officers regard themselves as the guardians of Turkish secularism, and this strong response to one meeting of a minor political party indicates their continuing vigilance. They are suspicious of Ozal because of his past connections to a religious party and because he has had to conciliate pro-Islamic elements of his party to forestall possible defections. Ozal, however, is also aware of the need to maintain the appearance as well as the substance of an official secular policy—as shown most recently by his demotion of a controversial, pro-Islamic education minister. President Evren probably understands Ozal's political circumstances better than do the General Staff officers. So long as Evren's backing remains clear, the military's concern is not likely to threaten Ozal.  
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
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
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# South African Parliamentary Byelections

District	1981 National Election Results		1985 Byelection Results	
	National Party	Rightwing*	National Party	Rightwing*
Bethlehem	6,008	2,182	6,623	5,435
Durban	4,885	-	4,307	1,914
Sasolburg	5,329	2,710	6,239	6,606
Springs	5,690	-	5,288	4,539
Vryburg	4,362	2,007	4,605	4,053
Totals	26,274	6,899	27,062	22,547

\* 1981 Herstigte Nasionale Party

\* 1985 Conservative Party and Herstigte Nasionale Party



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### Rightwing Appeal

The latest election results do reflect the impact of politically sensitive racial reforms, compounded by 14 months of major black unrest and the worst economic conditions in South Africa since the 1930s. Of the five seats contested, Sasolburg was the only district under the government's state-of-emergency regulations. The rightists capitalized on white racial fears and benefited from voter confusion over the extent and pace of Botha's reform program. Blue-collar workers in industrial areas—hit hard by recession and high unemployment—voted for the conservative parties in larger numbers than in past elections.

A prolonged slump in the economy would benefit conservatives and make whites less willing to accept aspects of racial reforms that affect the job market. And South Africa's economic outlook is bleak: inflation is running at 16 percent and economic growth is expected to remain at a depressed rate of 2 to 3 percent.

Rapid deterioration of the unrest would further shake voter confidence in the National Party and draw more whites toward the rightist parties. Moreover, growing black militancy and demands for more far-reaching reforms will increase the number of whites who fear that limited reforms will inevitably lead to black majority rule.


### Outlook

Although the right wing does not pose an immediate threat to the National Party's control of parliament, conservative gains are likely to continue because of the endemic violence and a stagnating economy. Continued dissension within the National Party over reforms, meanwhile, might enable the rightwing parties to persuade more of its legislators to defect over the coming years. The threat of defections may cause the National Party to modify its position on reforms and to adopt even harsher measures against nonwhite unrest.

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
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